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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this court is based upon U.C.A. § 78-2-2 (4): The Supreme
Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which the Supreme
Court has original appellate jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Whether the trial court erred in granting Appellee Farmers Insurance Group's
(Farmers) motion for summary judgment for the reason:
a.

The Utah Uninsured Motorist (UIM) Statute (U.C.A. §31A-22-305) is

ambiguous and cannot be interpreted in manner consistent with other portions of the UIM
statute;
b.

The Utah UIM statute is unconstitutional in that it deprives Appellant

Charisse Phillips (Phillips) of full recovery for her injuries and deprives her of the benefit
which paying UIM premiums affords;
c.

The underinsured portion of Farmers' policy, entered into between Farmers

and Phillips violates Utah's public policy of ensuring full recovery for accident victims;
and

3

d.

Utah should adopt standards recognized by the State of Arizona and other

states in allowing intra-policy coverage by combining the liability and UIM portions of
automobile insurance policies.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented hereinabove come before this court on review of the trial
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Farmers. On review, this court
view's the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, with no deference to the trial court's decision.

State Farm

Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Green. 89 P.3d 97, 99 (Utah 2003), citing
Arnold Indus, v. Love, 63 P.3d 721 (Utah 2002).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES
On appeal the issues raised by Phillips are those addressed in the Phillips'
Memorandum in Opposition to Framers' Motion for Summary Judgment.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
United States Constitution Amendment XIV §1:
§1
All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.

4

Utah Constitution Article 1 §7:
§7

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process

of law.
U.C.A. §31A-22-302(l)(c))(2000):
(1)
Every policy of insurance or combination of policies purchased to satisfy
the owner's or operator's security requirement of Section 41-12a-301 shall include:
(c)) underinsured motorist coverage under Section 31A-22-305, unless
affirmatively waived under Subsection 31 A-22-305(9)(c)).
U.C.A. §31A-22-305 (2000) a true and correct copy of which is attached in the
addendum hereto.
U.C.A. §31A-22-305(8)(b)(I) (2000):
(b)

The term "underinsured motor vehicle" does not include:

(I)
a motor vehicle that is covered under the liability coverage of the same
policy that also contains the underinsured motorist coverage; or
U.C.A. §31A-22-305(10)(a)(2000):
(10)(a)
Underinsured motorist coverage under this section applies to bodily
injury, sickness, disease, or death of an injured while occupying or using a motor vehicle
owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the insured, a resident spouse, or
resident relative of the insured, only if the motor vehicle is described in the policy under
which a claim is made, or if the motor vehicle is a newly acquired or replacement vehicle
covered under the terms of the policy. Except as provided in this Subsection (10), a
covered person injured in a vehicle described in a policy that includes underinsured
motorist benefits may not elect to collect underinsured motorist benefits from any other
motor vehicle insurance policy under which he is named insured.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of

Farmers. On or about 16 October 2000 Phillips was seriously injured in an automobile
accident while riding as a passenger in a vehicle driven by her husband. Farmers paid
Phillips the maximum liability coverage she was entitled to receive under the policy held
by Phillips. However, the amount paid was insufficient to cover expenses associated
with Phillips5 injuries. Consequently, Phillips filed this action seeking a declaratory
judgment entitling her to recover UIM benefits under the policy.
For purposes of Farmers' Motion for Summary Judgment, the parties entered into
a stipulation of facts, a true and correct copy of which is attached in the addendum
hereto. The trial court ruled, based on the parties' stipulation of facts, the terms and
conditions of the Farmers' policy and Utah law, Phillips was precluded from recovering
UIM benefits.
A true and correct copy of the trial court's decision regarding Farmers' Motion for
Summary Judgment (as found in the trial court record, pages 97-99) is attached in the
Addendum hereto.
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B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts constitute a verbatim recitation of the facts which the parties

stipulated to for purposes of Farmers' Motion for Summary Judgment (Stipulation of
Facts for Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 51-54):
L

On or about October 16, 2000, on 1-80 near Tooele, Utah, the Plaintiff,

Charisse Phillips, was riding as a passenger in a 1997 Jeep Cherokee automobile driven
by her husband, Bart C. Phillips, when the Jeep Cherokee automobile collided with
another vehicle and then rolled over.
2.

The accident resulted in injures to Charisse Phillips, for which Ms. Phillips

claims damages in excess of $100,000.00.
3.

Charisse Phillips claims that the accident was caused by negligence of her

husband, Bart C. Phillips in the manner in which he operated the Jeep Cherokee
automobile at the time of the accident.
4.

The Jeep Cherokee automobile operated by Bart C. Phillips at the time of

the accident was insured under an automobile insurance policy issued by the Defendant,
Farmers Insurance Exchange. The named insured under the policy was Charisse Phillips.
5.

The Farmers Insurance Exchange policy provided automobile liability

insurance coverage for Bart C. Phillips with limits of $50,000.00. Farmers Insurance
Exchange has paid the limits of $50,000 to Charisse Phillips, in exchange for a release of
7

all her claims against Bart C. Phillips. The Release specifically reserves all claims, if
any, which Charisse Phillips may have against Farmers Insurance Exchange for
underinsured motorist benefits as a result of the accident.
6.

The Farmers Insurance Exchange policy also includes underinsured

motorist coverage with limits of $50,000. The underinsured motorist provisions of the
policy include the following:
Subject to the Limits of Liability we will pay all sums which
an insured person is legally entitled to recover as damages
from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor
vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by the insured
person while occupying your insured car.

7.

The underinsured motorist coverage of the Farmers Insurance Exchange policy

contains the following provision:
An underinsured motor vehicle does not include a land motor vehicle:
a.

insured under the liability coverage of this policy;

b.

Furnished or available for the regular use of you or any family

member;
*

8.

*

*

The Jeep Cherokee automobile operated by Bart C. Phillips at the time of

the accident was the same vehicle which was insured under the liability coverage of the
Farmers Insurance Exchange policy. The vehicle also was furnished or available both for

8

the regular use of Charisse Phillips and her husband, Bart C. Phillips, who is a "family
member" under the terms of the Farmers Insurance policy.
9.

Charisse Phillips has made a claim for underinsured motorist benefits under

the Farmers Insurance Exchange policy.

Farmers Insurance Exchange has denied

coverage based on the provisions of the policy quoted above.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE 1
The trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Farmers was not
appropriate. Under Utah's UIM statute, automobile insurers are required to provide
purchasers with UIM coverage unless such coverage is waived in writing by the
purchaser. In this matter, Phillips did not waive UIM coverage and in fact purchased
$50,000 of UIM protection under her policy.
Subsequently, Phillips was severely injured in a vehicle accident while traveling
as a passenger in an automobile insured under her policy and driven by her spouse. The
cause of the accident was attributed to Phillips' spouse. While Phillips recovered under
the liability portion of her policy, the amount she recovered was insufficient to cover
costs associated with her injuries. Consequently, she filed this action to recover under
the UIM portion of her policy. On Farmers' Motion for Summary Judgment, Phillips
action was denied under U.C.A. §31A-22-305 (2000) on the grounds that the Farmers'
9

policy exclusion, which the court found prohibited Phillips recovery, was specifically
authorized under the UIM statute.
Phillips appeals the trial court's decision on grounds that the portion of the UIM
statute the trial court relied on in granting Farmers summary judgment, conflicts with
cannot be harmonized with other portions of the statute which mandate access to UIM
coverage.
ISSUE 2
Phillips entered into a contract with Farmers for UIM coverage.

After being

injured in an accident, she attempted to recover UIM benefits under her policy. Phillips
was denied UIM coverage on the grounds that the UIM policy she was trying to recover
under was the same policy through which she obtained liability coverage for injuries
attributed to the negligence of her spouse, who was the driver of the vehicle Phillips was
riding in at the time of the injury. But for state statutes which purport to authorize UIM
coverage exclusions, such as that under which Phillips was denied UIM benefits, Phillips
would be entitled to recover insurance proceeds she contracted for and paid to receive.
The statutory exclusion which was the basis for denying Phillips UIM benefits
constitutes a violation of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1 §7 of
the Utah Constitution.

These constitutional provisions prohibit state action which

deprive citizens of their property without due process of law.
10

Phillips held a property

interest in the UIM coverage she purchased and the unilateral actions of the legislature
denied her the benefit of her property interest at a time of critical need.
ISSUE 3
Utah courts have recognized a long standing public policy favoring the recovery
of insurance proceeds, by eligible injured parties. In this matter, Phillips entered into an
agreement with Farmers to purchase UIM coverage. She paid for the coverage and
subsequently attempted to recover under her policy, for injuries she sustained, through no
fault of her own, in an automobile accident.
Phillips and most other purchasers of retail automobile insurance coverage are
effectively powerless to negotiate terms and conditions with larger insurance companies.
Coverage is provided on a take it or leave it basis. Consequently, policy exclusions are
subject to the whims of insurers and the state legislature who collude in attempts to
regulate coverage availability. As a result, for consumers, such as Phillips, insurance
policies are the ultimate examples of adhesion contracts.
In this matter, Farmers' through its policy exclusions denied Phillips UIM benefits
she purchased and paid for. Farmers' policy exclusions violate Utah's public policy of
fostering responsible insurance coverage and promoting access to such coverage by
those who purchase insurance, when unfortunate occasions arise. This court should deny
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recognition of policy exclusions, such as those relied on by Farmers in withholding
Phillips' UIM benefits, on the grounds that Farmers' exclusions violate public policy.
ISSUE 4
The courts of Arizona, Hawaii, Washington and New Mexico have determined
that insurers should not be able to exclude otherwise eligible consumers from access to
UIM benefits based on policy exclusions. For instance, Arizona's court has focused on
whether the risks which parties seek to insure against constitute separate risks, e.g.,
purchasers of UIM coverage who seek to insure against accidental injuries caused by
negligent parties who lack assets or sufficient insurance coverage. If so, then public
policy dictates that insureds have access to purchased coverages, when accidents expose
insureds to the anticipated risks for which insurance was obtained.
In this matter, Phillips was severely injured in an automobile accident. She was a
passenger in a vehicle driven by her spouse. The vehicle was insured under a policy
owned by Phillips. Her spouse was insured as the guest driver of the vehicle under
Phillips' policy. As a result of her spouse's negligence, Phillips recovered under the
liability portion of her policy. However, the liability limits were insufficient to cover the
costs associated with the injuries Phillips sustained. As a result Phillips attempted to
recover additional benefits under the UIM coverage she purchased from Farmers.
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However, Phillips recovery of UIM benefits was denied based on statutory policy
exclusions.
Under the analysis of courts in other states, policy exclusions, such as those used
to deny Phillips UIM benefits, have been found violative of policy favoring recovery for
insured risks. Likewise, this court should adopt similar analysis and hold Farmers policy
exclusions void in favor of promoting recovery by injured parties, through insurance
policies purchased for the purpose of covering foreseeable risks.
ARGUMENT - ISSUE 1
THE UTAH UNINSURED MOTORIST (UIM) STATUTE
(U.C.A. §31A-22-305 (2000)) IS AMBIGUOUS AND CANNOT
BE INTERPRETED IN MANNER CONSISTENT WITH
OTHER PORTIONS OF THE UIM STATUTE
In granting Farmers' Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court relied on the
provisions of Farmers' policy, Part II(c))(l) of its policy pertaining to under insured
motorist (UIM) coverage, in denying Phillips' recovery. The court found the provisions
of the policy clearly and unambiguously precluded Phillips from obtaining UIM. As
noted in paragraph 7 of the Statement of Facts hereinabove, the relevant provision
provides:
An underinsured motor vehicle does not include a land motor vehicle:
(a) insured under the liability coverage of this policy;
13

(b) furnished or available for the regular used of you or any family
member;
However, the court's decision ignores provisions Utah law in effect at the time of
the accident, which also govern Phillips' right of recovery. In particular, at the time of
the accident, U.C.A. section 31A-22-305(10)(a) provided:
Underinsured motorist coverage under this section applies to bodily
injury sickness, disease, or death of an insured while occupying or
using a motor vehicle owned by, furnished, or available for the regular
use of the insured, a resident spouse, or resident relative of the insured,
only if the motor vehicle is described in the policy under which a claim
is made, or if the motor vehicle is a newly acquired or replacement
vehicle covered under the terms of the policy. Except as provided in
this Subsection (10) a covered person injured in a vehicle described in
a policy that includes underinsured motorist benefits may not elect to
collect underinsured motorist coverage benefits from any other motor
vehicle insurance policy under which he is a named insured.
This section of the statute applies to Phillips. She was physically injured while
occupying a motor vehicle she owned and available for her regular use as the insured.
The motor vehicle in which she was traveling is described in the policy under which her
claim is made. Phillips was injured in a vehicle described in a policy that contained
underinsured motorist benefits, however, her recovery is confined by the aforementioned
statute solely to the UIM policy of that covered motor vehicle in which the accident took
place. She is barred by the statute from collecting the UIM from any other "motor
vehicle insurance policy under which she is a named insured."

14

While Phillips is confined by U.C.A. §31A-22-305(10)(a) to collecting UIM
through the policy in place against the 1997 Jeep Cherokee Mr. Phillips was driving,
U.C.A. §31 A-22-305 (8)(b)(I) prevents her recovery under that policy. As noted in Point
II of Farmers' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, §31A-22305(8)(b)(I) is the basis for the provision in its policy by which it denied Phillips' UIM
recovery. However, together U.C.A. §31A-22-305(10)(a) and U.C.A. §31 A-22-305
(8)(b)(I) create an obvious ambiguity. Section (8)(b)(I) of the statute prevents recovery
while (10)(a) makes recovery available solely from the UIM policy of the vehicle
occupied by the insured when the accident occurred.
In reviewing insurance contracts, it is a settled principle of Utah law that
u

insurance policies should be construed liberally in favor of the insured and their

beneficiaries so as to promote and not defeat the purposes of insurance. " USF&G v.
Sandt, 854 P2. 519, 521 (Utah 1993) citing Richards v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co., 200 P.
1017, 1020 (1921). In the instant case the ambiguity which forms the basis of Phillips'
arises out of the policy and underlying legislation by which the terms of the policy are
mandated. As a result, the policy cannot be separated from the statute. The purpose and
intent of UIM is to provide coverage for victims, where liability coverage provided by a
negligent perpetrator is otherwise insufficient to cover the full cost of a victim's injuries,
U.C.A. §31A-22-305(9)(a).
15

U.C.A. §31A-22-302(l)(C) (1953 - 2000) mandated UIM coverage under U.C.A.
§31A-22-305, unless affirmatively waived. Consequently, the terms of the Farmers'
policy are bound by all of the requirements of s §31A-22-305. The reading of section
31A-22-305(10)(a) and 31A-22-305(8)(b)(I), in conjunction with §31A-22-302 (2000),
creates an outcome that is difficult to reconcile.
It appears the legislature was attempting to prohibit intra-policy stacking, as that
term is described in $tate Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green. 89 P.3d 97, 105 (Utah
2003), and which the Green court indicated (in dictum) would not be allowed. However,
Phillips is not trying to stack multiple UIM coverages. She is simply requesting the
benefit of coverage she paid for under one policy.
According to (8)(b)(I) the underinsured motor vehicle cannot be the same vehicle
that is covered by the liability portion of the policy, however section (10)(a) allows
recovery to the insured who is injured in a motor vehicle owned by the insured which
produces the following absurd result: the insured could only recover damages if he or
she had UIM coverage solely and not liability coverage, which is a violation of Utah law
U.C.A. § 31A-22-302 (2000). The combination of these sections of the Utah Code
produce, as stated, an inconsistent result and also prevent innocent victims from full
recovery.
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Accordingly, the requirements of U.C.A. §31A-22-302, §31A-22-305 and
Farmers' policy should be harmonized to allow Phillips recovery under her UIM
coverage.
ARGUMENT - ISSUE 2
THE UTAH UIM STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN
THAT IT DEPRIVES APPELLANT CHARISSE PHILLIPS
(PHILLIPS) OF FULL RECOVERY FOR HER INJURIES
AND DEPRIVES HER OF THE BENEFIT WHICH PAYING
UIM PREMIUMS AFFORDS
Phillips paid the premiums under her UIM coverage and she was injured in a
motor vehicle that provided UIM coverage. If she is denied the right to recover for her
injuries in excess of the liability coverage on the Jeep Cherokee she will be denied the
reasonable value of the UIM coverage she purchased. This deprivation constitutes a
violation of her substantive due process rights, in particular her property rights under
Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution, and the 14th Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
Both Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution and the 14th Amendment to the United
States Constitution make it clear "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law." Article I § 7 Utah Constitution, U.S. Const, amend. XIV §
2. Phillips has paid for the benefit of UIM coverage, which is being taken away by state
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action, through the Utah UIM statute and is thereby being deprived of her property
interest in the UIM coverage.
It is a well-recognized principal that in order to invoke the protection of the 14th
Amendment the plaintiff must show state action. Johnson v. Rodrigues 293 F.3d 1196
(Utah 2002). In this matter, state action lies in the statutes prohibition of recovery.
Phillips is hereby deprived of the benefit of UIM coverage she paid for. Mahone v.
Addicks UtiL Dist. 836 F.2d 921, 929 (5th Cir.1988) (noting that, at a minimum,
"property interest" as defined in the Fourteenth Amendment includes both real and
personal property).
Utah's UIM statute constitutes a violation of Phillips' constitutional rights in that
she is deprived of her property interest in the UIM premiums she paid for. The premiums
were paid in order insure Phillips against foreseeable accidental risks. Therefore, the
UIM statute should be declared unconstitutional by this court. In so doing, this action
will allow innocent accident victims appropriate recovery under their UIM policy
coverages.
ARGUMENT - ISSUE 3
THE UNDERINSURED PORTION OF FARMERS' POLICY,
ENTERED INTO BETWEEN FARMERS AND PHILLIPS
VIOLATES UTAH'S PUBLIC POLICY OF ENSURING
FULL RECOVERY FOR ACCIDENT VICTIMS
18

In the alternative to arguments presented hereinabove, if this court determines that
Utah's UIM statute in place at the time of Phillips' accident (U.C.A. §31A-22-305
(2000)) and Farmers' policy deny her recovery of UIM benefits, then Phillips requests
the court find this denial constitutes a violation of Utah's public policy. Phillips entered
into a motor vehicle insurance policy with Farmers. The policy provides UIM coverage
and Phillips made premium payments for the UIM coverage.
The trial court held the UIM portion of Phillips' policy, which mirrors Utah Code
section 31A-22-305 (8)(b)(I), prevents recovery from both the liability coverage and the
UIM coverage if the motor vehicle on which the claim is made is also covered under the
liability provision of the same policy. In its order the on summary judgment (page 1), the
trial court noted the applicable provision as follows:
An underinsured motor vehicle does not include a land motor vehicle:
(a)

insured under the liability coverage of this policy.

(b)

furnished or available for the regular use of you or any family
member;...

If the trial court's decision is upheld, this exclusion bars recovery to policy
owners, like Phillips, who are injured as a result of others' negligence, but who are
required to look solely to the liability portion of their policies for recovery. Phillips did
not cause the accident and even though she has paid UIM premiums, she is denied
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recovery under her UIM policy for that portion of her loses which exceeded the liability
coverage she was entitled to. Utah law recognizes UIM coverage as a source for the
innocent victim to receive full recovery in an accident:
Underinsured motorist coverage provides first-party insurance
protection for damages that exceed the limits of the tort-feasor's bodily
injury coverage. Underinsured motorist coverage is a facet of
uninsured motorist coverage; its purpose is to provide insurance
protection to the insured against damages caused by a negligent
motorist as if the motorist had another liability policy in the amount of
the underinsured policy. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d
519, 521 (Utah 1993).

It should not matter that Phillips's husband was the tortfeasor, she should be able
to recover for the damages suffered because of her husband's negligence. "Since 1921
this Court [the Utah Supreme Court] has expressed its commitment to the principle that
insurance policies should be construed liberally in favor of the insured and their
beneficiaries so as to promote and not defeat the purposes of insurance" Richards v.
Standard Ace. Ins. Co.. 58 Utah 622, 200 P. 1017, 1020 (1921); Colovos v. Home Life
Ins. Co.. 83 Utah 401, 28 P.2d 607, 610 (1934); see also Browning v. Equitable Life
Assur. S o c 94 Utah 570, 80 P.2d 348, 352 (1938) [hereinafter Browning II ] ("In
construing a policy of life insurance, that interpretation is to be placed upon the words of
the policy which is most favorable to the insured.").
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This fundamental rule is based on the fact that an insurance policy is a classic
example of an adhesion contract. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Sandt 854 P.2d 519
(1993). The Utah Supreme Court has maintained this ideology regarding interpretation of
insurance contracts for many years: "Thirty years after Browning I this Court reaffirmed
the proposition that insurance policies should be strictly construed against the insurer
and in favor of the insured..." DiEnes v. Safeco Life Ins. Co., 21 Utah 2d 147, 150, 442
P.2d 468, 471 (Utah 1968). In DiEnes, the Court, relying on Browning I, characterized
this position as "ftjhe rule for interpreting an insurance policy " Id. at 150, 442 P.2d at
471. In Whitlock v. Old American Insurance Co., 21 Utah 2d 131, 135, 442 P.2d 26, 28
(Utah 1968), the Court reiterated this rule, stating, "We have heretofore held that the
insured is entitled to the broadest coverage he could reasonably understand from the
policy." (Emphasis added.) See also P.E. Ashton Co. v. Joyner, 17 Utah 2d 162, 164,406
P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1965), where the Court stated, "[T]he insured is entitled to the
broadest protection that he could reasonably believe the commonly understood meaning
of its terms afforded him." U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. Sandt 854 P.2d 519 (1993).
For this reason the rule of strictissimi juris has been applied almost universally to
insurance contracts, and this jurisdiction, like many others, requires liberal construction
in favor of the insured, to accomplish the purpose for which the insurance was purchased.
Browning v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc, 94 Utah 532, 72 P.2d 1060, 1073 (1937)
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(Larson, J., concurring in part, joined by Folland, C.J., Hanson, J., and Moffat, J.)
[hereinafter Browning I ] (emphasis added); see also Gibson v. Equitable Life Assur.
Soc., 84 Utah 452, 36 P.2d 105, 109 (1934).
Farmers, through its adhesion contract, attempts to defeat the purpose of insurance
by preventing an innocent victim from fully recovering her damages. Therefore, this
Court should interpret the Farmers' policy liberally and declare because Phillips cannot
recover the full amount of her damages under the liability policy, she should be allowed
additional recovery through the UIM portion of her policy.
ARGUMENT - ISSUE 4
UTAH SHOULD ADOPT STANDARDS RECOGNIZED BY
THE STATE OF ARIZONA AND OTHER STATES IN
ALLOWING INTRA-POLICY COVERAGE BY COMBINING
THE LIABILITY AND UIM PORTIONS OF
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICIES
Arizona recognizes intra-policy coverage of liability and UIM for the benefit of
the named insured. See Taylor v. Travelers Indem. Co. of America, 9 P.2d 1049 (Ariz.
2000). In Taylor, the named insured, Mr. Taylor, caused an accident. He was killed and
four other people were injured. IdL at 1051. Mr. Taylor's insurance provider paid out the
$300,000 the liability limit of the policy to the four injured persons. Id. One of the
injured persons was Nellie Taylor, Mr. Taylor's wife. Id. Mrs. Taylor received $183,
500 for her injuries, an amount much less than her medical bills. Id Mrs. Taylor made a
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claim against her insurer for the UIM portion of her and her husband's policy, which
was denied. Id, Travelers argued that statute and case law prevented Nellie Taylor from
combining her UIM and liability coverages.
The Arizona Supreme Court found that Mrs. Taylor was not precluded by statute
nor by case law from combining her UIM coverage and liability coverage. The Arizona
Supreme Court found that "[i]ntra-policy setoff provisions limiting an insurer's exposure
violate the statute: 'the insured purchased coverage against separate risks; if more than
one of these risks occur, public policy dictates that the insured receive the coverage she
has purchased, which would be coverage for each risk.'" Taylor at 1055. See also Diane
Mihalsky, Duran v. Hartford Ins. Co.: When is an Insured Under insured?\ 22 ARIZ. ST.
LJ. 493, 522-23 (1990).
In Taylor and in this case, both parties purchased liability and UIM coverage. Due
to unfortunate circumstances both risks insured against occurred. Consequently, both
coverages should apply.
Several states, have analyzed similar issues and support Phillips' request. In
Tissell v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 795 P.2d 126 (Wash. 1990), the plaintiff was seriously
injured when her husband drove their car off the road. She made claims against both the
liability and UIM portions of her family's auto policy. Based on the pivotal, prior case of
Millers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Briggs, 655 P.2d 891 (Wash. 1983), the trial court held that,
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although plaintiff could collect from the liability limits, she could not collect from the
UIM limits.
On review, the Washington Supreme Court distinguished Millers and overruled
the trial court. It noted the plaintiffs in Millers were not members of the insured's family
and the plaintiffs in Millers were not the purchasers of the UIM insurance. The court
stated:
"Where the victim is the purchaser of the UIM policy, however, the
denial of UIM benefits will thwart the public policy in favor of full
compensation....
...In the present case, Tissell is the purchaser of the UIM policy claimed
against. Unlike the victims in Millers, she could not have purchased
UIM coverage elsewhere; this is her UIM policy....
...Millers, then, is a limited exception to the policy of full compensation
for victims. Millers stands only for the rule that a victim who is not the
insured can be excluded from recovery against the UIM portion of a
policy where he is compensated by that policy's liability coverage. This
case, in contrast, demonstrates that such a liability coverage exclusion
cannot be applied to bar UIM recovery by the purchaser of the policy
in question." Tissell, 795 P.2d at 128; see also Jain v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 926 P.2d 923 (Wash. 1996) (wherein the Washington
Supreme Court reiterated its position in Tissell).
The analysis set forth by Tissell and Jain was followed in Kaiama v. AIG Hawaii
Ins. Co. Inc.. 930 P.2d 1352 (Hawaii 1997). The Hawaii Supreme Court found that a
family member/named insured (i.e. a daughter) was entitled to collect from the adverse
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driver's (i.e. the father's) liability insurance and her family's UIM insurance. The court
specifically noted:
Millers upheld the validity of clauses excluding the policyholder's care
from the definition of underinsured vehicle. However, the injured
party in Millers was not a named insured as in Tissell but rather was
an unrelated passenger. This difference is critical....
This result is consistent with the scope of UIM coverage to the extent
UIM is meant to place the injured's insurance carrier in the shoes of
the underinsured tortfeasor. When the injured is a third party "other
insured," he or she has no UIM coverage with the driver's insurance
company. Instead, his or her own carrier should step in. However,
when the injured is a named insured, her or his carrier is obliged to
step into the shoes of the insured driver to supplement the coverage.
Kaiama, 903 P.2d at 1355, citing, Jain, 926 P.2d at 926-27.
Similarly, the New Mexico Supreme Court followed the same rationale as Tissell
Jain, and Kaiama. It held, although Class II insureds (i.e. guest passengers) cannot
combine the liability and UIM limits of the host driver's policy, Mountain States Mutual
Cas. v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 527 (N.M. 1993), Class I insureds (i.e. named insured
passengers) can combine both limits. Padilla v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 787 P.2d 835 (N.M.
1990). The New Mexico court's reasoning for the different treatment of guest passengers
versus named insured passengers was: (1) named insured passengers purchase the UIM
coverage and have a contractual relationship with the UIM carrier while the guest
passengers do not; (2) UIM coverage follows the insureds, not the vehicles; and (3) the
guest passengers will recover UIM benefits from the policies on which they are named
25

insureds. Mountain, 848 P.2d at 529. See also State Farm v. Young. 443 S.E.2d 756
(N.C. 1994) (allowed son of named insured to combine liability and UIM insurance);
Bratcher v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co.. 256 S.E.2d 151 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987) (allowed
son of named insured to combine liability and UIM insurance); Holman v. All Nation Ins.
Co., 288 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. 1980) (allowed named insured to combine liability and
UIM insurance).
In the present case, Charisse Phillips purchased UIM coverage, she has no
alternative source of UIM coverage, and she has not been fully compensated for her
injuries. Like the plaintiffs in Taylor. Tissell, Jain. Kaiama. and Padilla. Phillips should
be able to combine her UIM coverage with the liability coverage that she received.
CONCLUSION
The State of Utah has gone to great lengths to adopt a statutory automobile
insurance scheme that protects innocent victims. By law, insurers must provide
purchasers the opportunity to buy UIM coverage. This coverage cannot be denied
purchasers unless it is specifically waived.
Phillips took advantage of the protection afforded by law and purchased $50,000
of UIM coverage under her Farmers policy. The coverage was purchased for the express
purpose of protecting Phillips from the negligence of others. For the reasons set herein,
this court should overturn the trial court's decision and hold that UIM benefits cannot be
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denied innocent victims who have legally and lawfully paid for the benefit of UIM
coverage.
DATED this ?

>V<r

day of September 2004.
Law Offices of Kathleen McConkie

Todd Nilsen
Kathleen McConkie
Attorneys for Appellant, Charisse Phillips
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 31A. INSURANCE CODE
CHAPTER 22. CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES
PART III. MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE

Copyright © 1953-2000 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS

Publishing companies. All rights reserved.

31A-22-305

Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.

(1) As used in this section, "covered persons" includes:
(a) the named insured;
(b) persons related to the named insured by blood, marriage, adoption, or
guardianship, who are residents of the named insured's household, including those
who usually make their home in the same household but temporarily live elsewhere;
(c) any person occupying or using a motor vehicle referred to in the policy or
owned by a self-insurer; and
(d) any person who is entitled to recover damages against the owner or
operator of the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily
injury to or death of persons under Subsection (1)(a), (b), or (c).
(2) As used in this section, "uninsured motor vehicle" includes:
(a) (i) a vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is not covered
under a liability policy at the time of an injury-causing occurrence; or
(ii) (A) a vehicle covered with lower liability limits than required by Section
31A-22-304;
(B) the vehicle described in Subsection
of the deficiency;

(2)(a)(ii)(A) is uninsured to the extent

(b) an unidentified vehicle that left the scene of an accident proximately
caused by the vehicle operator;
(c) a vehicle covered by a liability policy, but coverage for an accident is
disputed by the liability insurer for more than 60 days or, beginning with the
effective date of this act, continues to be disputed for more than 60 days; or
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(d) (i) an insured vehicle if, before or after the accident, the liability
insurer of the vehicle is declared insolvent by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(ii) the vehicle described in Subsection (2)(d)(i) is uninsured only to the extent
that the claim against the insolvent insurer is not paid by a guaranty association
or fund.
(3) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302 (1) (b) provides
coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover damages from
owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury,
sickness, disease, or death.
(b) For new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, the limits of
uninsured motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits of the
insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum uninsured motorist
coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy,
unless the insured purchases coverage in a lesser amount by signing an
acknowledgment form provided by the insurer that:
(i) waives the higher coverage;
(ii) reasonably explains the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage; and
(iii) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase uninsured motorist
coverage with limits equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor
vehicle liability coverage or the maximum uninsured motorist coverage limits
available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy.
(c) Uninsured motorist coverage m a y not be sold with limits that are less than
the minimum bodily injury limits for motor vehicle liability policies
under
Section 31A-22-304.
(d) The acknowledgment under Subsection (3)(b) continues for that issuer of
the uninsured motorist coverage until the insured, in writing, requests different
uninsured motorist coverage from the insurer.
(e) (i) In conjunction with the first two renewal notices sent after January
1, 2001, for policies existing on that date, the insurer shall disclose in the
same medium as the premium renewal notice, an explanation of the purpose of
uninsured motorist coverage and the costs associated with increasing the coverage
in amounts up to and including the maximum amount available by the insurer under
the insured's motor vehicle policy.
(ii) The disclosure shall be sent to all insureds that carry uninsured motorist
coverage limits in an amount less than the insured's motor vehicle liability
policy limits or the maximum uninsured motorist coverage limits available by the
insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy.
(4) (a) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b), the named insured m a y
reject uninsured motorist coverage by an express writing to the insurer that
provides liability coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(1)(a).
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(ii) This rejection shall be on a form provided by the insurer that includes a
reasonable explanation of the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage.
(iii) This rejection continues for that issuer of the liability coverage until the
insured in writing requests uninsured motorist coverage from that liability
insurer.
(b) (i) All persons, including governmental entities, that are engaged in the
business of, or that accept payment for, transporting natural persons by motor
vehicle, and all school districts that provide transportation services for their
students, shall provide coverage for all vehicles used for that purpose, by
purchase of a policy of insurance or by self-insurance, uninsured motorist
coverage of at least $25,000 per person and $500,000 per accident.
(ii) This coverage is secondary to any other insurance covering an injured covered
person.
(c) Uninsured motorist coverage:
(i) is secondary to the benefits provided by Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers'
Compensation Act;
(ii) may not be subrogated by the Workers 1 Compensation insurance carrier;
(iii) may not be reduced by any benefits provided by Workers' Compensation
insurance; and
(iv) may be reduced by health insurance subrogation only after the covered person
has been made whole.
(d) As used in this Subsection (4):
(i) "Governmental entity" has the same meaning as under Section 63-30- 2.
(ii) "Motor vehicle" has the same meaning as under Section 41-la-102.
(5) When a covered person alleges that an uninsured motor vehicle under
Subsection (2)(b) proximately caused an accident without touching the covered
person or the vehicle occupied by the covered person, the covered person must show
the existence of the uninsured motor vehicle by clear and convincing evidence
consisting of more than the covered person's testimony.
(6) (a) The limit of liability for uninsured motorist coverage for two or more
motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or stacked to determine the
limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for any one accident.
(b) (i) Subsection (6)(a) applies to all persons except a covered person as
defined under Subsection (7)(b)(ii).
(ii) A covered person as defined under Subsection (7)(b)(ii) is entitled to the
highest limits of uninsured motorist coverage afforded for any one vehicle that
the covered person is the named insured or an insured family member.
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(iii) This coverage shall be in addition to the coverage on the vehicle the
covered person is occupying.
(iv) Neither the primary nor the secondary coverage may be set off against the
other.
(c) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the time of an accident shall be
primary coverage, and the coverage elected by a person described under Subsections
(1)(a) and (b) shall be secondary coverage.
(7) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage under this section applies to bodily injury,
sickness, disease, or death of covered persons while occupying or using a motor
vehicle only if the motor vehicle is described in the policy under which a claim
is made, or if the motor vehicle is a newly acquired or replacement vehicle
covered under the terms of the policy. Except as provided in Subsection (6) or
(7), a covered person injured in a vehicle described in a policy that includes
uninsured motorist benefits may not elect to collect uninsured motorist coverage
benefits from any other motor vehicle insurance policy under which he is a covered
person.
(b) Each of the following persons m a y also recover uninsured motorist benefits
under any other policy in which they are described as a "covered person" as
defined in Subsection (1):
(i) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an uninsured motor vehicle; and
(ii) a covered person injured while occupying or using a motor vehicle that is not
owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the covered person, the
covered person's resident spouse, or the covered person's resident relative.
(c) A covered person in Subsection (7)(b) is not barred against making
subsequent elections if recovery is unavailable under previous elections.
(8) (a) As used in this section, "underinsured motor vehicle" includes a
vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is covered under a liability
policy at the time of an injury-causing occurrence, but which has insufficient
liability coverage to compensate fully the injured party for all special and
general damages.
(b) The term "underinsured motor vehicle" does not include:
(i) a motor vehicle that is covered under the liability coverage of the same
policy that also contains the underinsured motorist coverage; or
(ii) an uninsured motor vehicle as defined in Subsection (2).
(9) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(1)(c)
provides coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover damages
from owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury,
sickness, disease, or death.
(b) For new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, the limits of
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underinsured motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits of the
insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist
coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy,
unless the insured purchases coverage in a lesser amount by signing an
acknowledgment form provided by the insurer that:
(i) waives the higher coverage;
(ii) reasonably explains the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage; and
(iii) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase underinsured motorist
coverage with limits equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor
vehicle liability coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist coverage limits
available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy.
(c) Underinsured motorist coverage may not be sold with limits that are less
than $10,000 for one person in any one accident and at least $20,000 for two or
more persons in any one accident.
(d) The acknowledgment under Subsection (9)(b) continues for that issuer of
the underinsured motorist coverage until the insured, in writing, requests
different underinsured motorist coverage from the insurer.
(e) The named insured's underinsured motorist coverage, as described in
Subsection (9)(a), is secondary to the liability coverage of an owner or operator
of an underinsured motor vehicle, as described in Subsection (8). Underinsured
motorist coverage may not be set off against the liability coverage of the owner
or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle, but shall be added to, combined
with, or stacked upon the liability coverage of the owner or operator of the
underinsured motor vehicle to determine the limit of coverage available to the
injured person.
(f) (i) A named insured may reject underinsured motorist coverage by an
express writing to the insurer that provides liability coverage under Subsection
31A-22-302(l)(a).
(ii) This written rejection shall be on a form provided by the insurer that
includes a reasonable explanation of the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage
and when it would be applicable.
(iii) This rejection continues for that issuer of the liability coverage until the
insured in writing requests underinsured motorist coverage from that liability
insurer.
(g) (i) In conjunction with the first two renewal notices sent after January
1, 2001, for policies existing on that date, the insurer shall disclose in the
same medium as the premium renewal notice, an explanation of the purpose of
underinsured motorist coverage and the costs associated with increasing the
coverage in amounts up to and including the maximum amount available by the
insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy.
(ii) The disclosure shall be sent to all insureds that carry underinsured motorist
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coverage limits in an amount less than the insured's motor vehicle liability
policy limits or the maximum underinsured motorist coverage limits available by
the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy.
(10) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under this section applies to bodily
injury, sickness, disease, or death of an insured while occupying or using a motor
vehicle owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the insured, a
resident spouse, or resident relative of the insured, only if the motor vehicle is
described in the policy under which a claim is made, or if the motor vehicle is a
newly acquired or replacement vehicle covered under the terms of the policy.
Except as provided in this Subsection (10), a covered person injured in a vehicle
described in a policy that includes underinsured motorist benefits may not elect
to collect underinsured motorist coverage benefits from any other motor vehicle
insurance policy under which he is a named insured.
(b) (i) The limit of liability for underinsured motorist coverage for two or
more motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or stacked to determine
the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person for any one
accident.
(ii) Subsection (10)(b)(i) applies to all persons except a covered person as
defined under Subsection (10)(c)(i)(B).
(iii) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the time of an accident shall be
primary coverage, and the coverage elected by a person described under Subsections
(1)(a) and (b) shall be secondary coverage.
(c) Underinsured motorist coverage:
(i) is secondary to the benefits provided by Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers'
Compensation Act;
(ii) may not be subrograted by the Workers' Compensation insurance carrier;
(iii) may not be reduced by any benefits provided by Workers' Compensation
insurance; and
(iv) may be reduced by health insurance subrogation only after the covered person
has been made whole.
(d) (i) Each of the following persons may also recover underinsured motorist
coverage benefits under any other policy in which they are described as a "covered
person" as defined under Subsection (1):
(A) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an underinsured motor vehicle; or

(B) a covered person injured while occupying or using a motor vehicle that is not
owned by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the covered person, the
covered person's resident spouse, or the covered person's resident relative.
(ii) This coverage shall only be available as a secondary source of coverage.
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(iii) A covered person as defined under Subsection (10)(b)(i)(B) is entitled to
the highest limits of underinsured motorist coverage afforded for any one vehicle
that the covered person is the named insured or an insured family member.
(iv) This coverage shall be in addition to the coverage on the vehicle the covered
person is occupying.
(v) Neither the primary nor the secondary coverage may be set off against the
other.
(e) A covered injured person is not barred against making subsequent elections
if recovery is unavailable under previous elections.
(11) A claim may not be brought by a covered person against a motor vehicle
underinsured motorist policy more than three years after the date of the last
liability policy payment.

History: C. 1953, 31A-22-305, enacted by L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, §
157; 1987, ch. 162, § 1; 1992, ch. 1, § 4; 1992, ch. 132, § 3; 1993, ch. 271, § 2;
1994, ch. 316, § 15; 1995, ch. 294, § 1; 1996, ch. 240, § 12; 1997, ch. 375, § 14;
1999, ch. 158, § 1; 2000, ch. 188, § 1.

NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS

Amendment Notes. — T h e 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, designated
Subsection (6)(a) and added Subsections (6)(b) and (6)(c); substituted "Subsection
(6) or (7)" for "Subsection (7)(b),f in the second sentence of Subsection (7)(a);
added Subsections (10)(b)(ii) through (c)(v) and made related changes;
redesignated former Subsection (10)(c) as (10)(d) and deleted the first sentence
authorizing elections of underinsured motorist coverage under specified
circumstances; and made stylistic changes.
The 1996 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "Title 35A, Chapter 3"
for "Title 35, Chapter 1" in Subsection (4)(b)(ii) and added "(10)" in Subsections
(10) (b) (ii) and (10) (c) (iii) .
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "Title 34A, Chapter 2"
for "Title 35A, Chapter 3" in Subsection (4)(b)((ii).
The 1999 amendment, effective March 18, 1999, added Subsection (2) (c),
redesignating former Subsection (2)(c) as (2)(d), and made related and stylistic
changes in the section.
The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, added Subsections (3)(b) to (3)(e),
(4)(a)(ii), (4) (c) (ii) to (4)(c)(iv), (9) (b) to (9)(d), (9)(f)(ii), (10) (c), and
(11), and made related changes; deleted "For new policies or contracts written
after January 1, 1993" from the beginning of Subsection (9)(f)(i); rewrote
Subsection (9) (g) , revising the provisions for notice and disclosure; and made
stylistic changes.
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Compiler's Notes. — T h e phrase "the effective date of this act" in Subsection
(2) (c) means March 18, 1999, the effective date of Laws 1999, ch. 158, which added
that subsection.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Exclusionary clause.
Hit and run.
"Legally entitled to recover."
Cited.

Exclusionary clause.
An exclusionary clause to uninsured motorist coverage is permissible. Former §
41-12-21.1, which required insurers to offer uninsured motorist coverage and
authorized motorists to waive coverage, did not further require insurers to allow
an individual to purchase insurance on one vehicle and obtain coverage on all the
other vehicles in his household. Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 743 P.2d
1227 (Utah 1987).
Neither this section nor public policy forbids restrictions on uninsured motorist
coverage such as an exclusion from coverage of vehicles owned by the insured not
included in the policy and for which no premiums are paid. Hind v. Quilles, 745
P.2d 1239 (Utah 1987).
A policy that covered the insured for any injury caused by an uninsured motorist
, excluding therefrom only uninsured "automobiles" owned by the insured, did not
exclude uninsured motorist coverage when the insured was operating a motorcycle.
Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wright, 770 P.2d 1019 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Hit and run.
Utah law does not require an actual collision to recover under the uninsured
motorist statute. Marakis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 765 P.2d 882 (Utah 1988)
(decided under prior law).

"Legally entitled to recover."
For an insured to satisfy the "legally entitled to recover" criterion, a viable
claim that can be reduced to judgment is required. Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau
Ins. Co., 927 P.2d 192 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied, 934 P.2d 652 (Utah
1997).

Cited in Wagner v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 786 P.2d 763 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); United
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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ADDENDUM - 2
STIPULATION OF FACTS FOR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Aaron Alma Nelson (#2379)
NELSON, CHIPMAN, QUIGLEY & HANSEN
215 South State Street, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-3627
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CHARISSE PHILLIPS.
STIPULATION OF FACTS
FOR MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 020911489 PI

FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,

:

Defendant.

:

Judge Timothy R. Hanson

For purposes of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment only, the parties stipulate to the
following facts:
1.

On or about October 16,2000, on 1-80 near Tooele, Utah, the Plaintiff, Charisse Phillips, was

riding as a passenger in a 1997 Jeep Cherokee automobile driven by her husband, Bart C. Phillips, when the
Jeep Cherokee automobile collided with another vehicle and then rolled over.
2.

The accident resulted in injuries to Charisse Phillips, for which Ms. Phillips claims damages

in excess of $100,000.00.
3.

Charisse Phillips claims that the accident was caused by negligence of her husband, Bart C.

Phillips in the manner in which he operated the Jeep Cherokee automobile at the time of the accident.

4.

The Jeep Cherokee automobile operated by Bart C. Phillips at the time of the accident was

insured under an automobile insurance policy issued by the Defendant, Farmers Insurance Exchange. The
named insured under the policy was Charisse Phillips.
5.

The Farmers Insurance Exchange policy provided automobile liability insurance coverage

for Bart C. Phillips, with limits of $50,000.00. Farmers Insurance Exchange has paid the limits of
$50,000.00 to Charisse Phillips, in exchange for a release of all of her claims against Bart. C. Phillips. The
Release specifically reserves all claims, if any, which Charisse PhilUps may have against Farmers Insurance
Exchange for underinsured motorist benefits as a result of the accident.
6.

The Farmers Insurance Exchange policy also includes underinsured motorist coverage with

limits of $50,000.00. The underinsured motorist provisions of the policy include the following:
Subject to the Limits of Liability we will pay all sums which an insured
gerson is legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator
of an underinsured motor vehickliecause of bodily injury sustained by the
jnsmxji^^
Charisse Phillips qualifies as an "insured person", since she is the named insured under the policy.
7.

The underinsured motorist coverage of the Farmers Insurance Exchange policy contains the

following provision:
4*UinderiB^^^

does not include a land motor vehicle:

(a) insured under the liability coverage of this policy;
0 ) furnished OLayailable;for the r e g u l ^
family member;
*

*

2

*

8.

The Jeep Cherokee automobile operated by Bart C. Phillips at the time of the accident was

the same vehicle which was insured underAe^iabilfe

of the Farmers Insurance Exchange policy.

The vehicle also was furnished or available both for the regular use qf f^arisse Phillips and her husband,
Bart C. Phillips, who is a "family member" under the terms of the Farmers Insurance policy.
9.

Charisse Phillips has made a claim for underinsured motorist benefits under the Farmers

Insurance Exchange policy. Farmers Insurance Exchange has denied coverage based on the provisions of
the policy quoted above.
DATED this

/ ;/ day of

c\e O J J)f
-r

r

_, 2003.
•

/

•KaSUtu^yT? ^~

x^i

KATHLEEN MCCONKIE
Attorney for Plaintiff

NELSON, CHIPMAN, QUIGLEY & HANSEN

^cs^^f^rA/CJi^^r

./&

AARON ALMA NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ,*> day oiC^'/Z^/

, 2003,1 caused to be deposited into the U.S.

Mails, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy ofthe foregoing STIPULATION OF FACTS FOR MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, addressed to:
Ms. Kathleen McConkie
Attorney at Law
150 North Main, #202
Bountiful, Utah 84010

4

ADDENDUM - 3
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

FILES DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

MAR - h 2004
SALTt/RtCOUNfV^ '*-'"

Aaron Alma Nelson (#2379)
NELSON, CHIPMAN, QUIGLEY & HANSEN
215 South State Street, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-3627
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CHARISSE PHILLIPS,
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 020911489 PI
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Judge Timothy R. Hanson
Defendant.

The motion of Defendant, Farmers Insurance Exchange, for summary judgment duly came before
this Court for hearing on February 23, 2004, at 10:00 a.m.. Prior to the hearing the parties submitted
memoranda which were reviewed by the Coun. The Court heard arguments by the attorneys for both parties.
After hearing arguments by the parties and the Court being fully advised, the Court finds that the
Farmers Insurance Exchange policy clearly and unambiguously excludes coverage for underinsured motorist
coverage in the following provision:
An underinsured motor vehicle does not include a land motor vehicle:
(a)
insured under the liability coverage of this policy.
(b)
furnished or available for the regular use of you or any family
member; . . .
The provisions of the Farmers Insurance Exchange policy are specifically authorized by Utah Code

97

Annotated §31A-22-305(8)(b), which provides:
(b)

the term "underinsured motor vehicle" does not include:
(i) a motor vehicle that is covered under the liability coverage of the same
policy that also contains underinsured motorist coverage;
(iii) a motor vehicle owned or leased by the named insured, the named
insured's spouse or any dependent of the named insured.

These specific provisions of Utah Code Annotated §31A-22-3 05 control over any general provisions
of the statute and specifically authorize the exclusions under the Farmers Insurance Exchange policy.
The public policy of the State of Utah is embodied in Utah Code Annotated §31 A-22-3 05(8)(b),
which specifically authorizes the exclusions in the Farmers Insurance Exchange policy and the exclusions
in the policy are not contrary to the public policy of the State of Utah.
Neither the Fanners Insurance Exchange policy nor Utah Code Annotated §31 A-22-305(8)(b) is in
violation of any of Plaintiffs rights to due process of law under the United States or Utah Constitutions.
The motion of Defendant, Farmers Insurance Exchange, for summary judgment is hereby granted.
Plaintiff is not entitled to underinsured motorist coverage under the policy issued by Farmers
Insurance Exchange and Farmers Insurance Exchange is hereby awarded summary judgment on all issues
raised in Plaintiffs Amended Complaint.
DATED this J__ day of /tf/Z^t-^^

,^04.
BY THE COURT

qtf

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that on the ^ 3 day oiJ^7»AJ

— T

, 2004,1 caused a true and correct

es-f—•

copy of the foregoing proposed SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be deposited into the U.S. Mails, postage
prepaid thereon, addressed to:
Ms. Kathleen McConkie
Attorney at Law
150 North Main, #202
Bountiful, Utah 84010

^a^^yf
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